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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
PRESTON V. STATE: REASONABLE PROTECTIVE HOUSING
PROVIDED TO A STATE’S WITNESS IS NOT A “BENEFIT”
WITHIN THE MEANING OF MARYLAND CRIMINAL
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION 3:13.
By: Andrew Middleman
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a “benefit,” as used in
Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:13, is “something akin to” a
direct, quid pro quo exchange for a State’s witness’s testimony. Preston v.
State, 444 Md. 67, 85, 118 A.3d 902, 913 (2015). The court of appeals further
held that reasonable protective housing provided to a State’s witness, by itself,
is not a “benefit.” Id. at 85, 104, 118 A.3d at 913, 924. The court also
concluded that moving a State’s witness into protective housing, at State
expense, was “not unreasonable.” Id. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial
court’s omission of a particularized witness credibility instruction that would
have directed the jury to consider the housing accommodations a witness
received. Id.
In March 2009, Nichelle Payton hosted a party at which Keon Barnes was
shot and killed. Homicide detective Michael Moran interviewed Payton
several times. Initially, Payton offered nothing more than her party guests’
names.
Shortly thereafter, Dontae Preston, Petitioner, knocked on the door at
Payton’s home. Preston did not threaten or even communicate with Payton.
Payton did not answer the door.
Then, in early April, Payton asked Moran to relocate her because she was
afraid to stay in her home. But Moran urged Payton into another interview.
This time, though, Payton identified Preston in a photo array. Moran,
moreover, recorded Payton’s account of Barnes’s death, namely that she heard
gunshots and saw Preston leave the scene, but that she did not see anyone with
a gun.
Moran asked the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office to move Payton
into protective housing only after Payton cooperated with his investigation.
The State’s Attorney’s Office paid more than $13,000 for Payton’s eightmonth stay in protective housing. Meanwhile, the State charged Preston in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City with first-degree murder and related crimes.
At trial, defense counsel probed whether Payton withheld her statement
until after she had assured her eventual relocation. Payton answered, “Correct.
No.” Defense counsel did not clarify Payton’s apparently ambiguous
response.
Moran, for his part, testified that he did not immediately submit the request
for Payton’s relocation because Payton had partially concealed her account of
Barnes’s death. Moran added that he waited to submit the request because, he
explained, “It’s a lot for someone to move their life.”
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In light of Payton’s and Moran’s testimony, defense counsel asked the
circuit court to instruct the jury according to Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury
Instruction 3:13 (2d ed. 2012 & Supp. 2013) (“MPJI-Cr”). MPJI-Cr 3:13,
entitled “Witness Promised Benefit,” directs the jury to cautiously consider
the extent to which a “financial benefit” or “benefit” influences a State’s
witness’s testimony.
The circuit court explained that the evidence was insufficient to show that
Payton exchanged her testimony for a “financial benefit” or “benefit.” As
such, the circuit court rejected defense counsel’s proposal in favor of MPJI-Cr
3:10, the standard witness credibility instruction. The jury found Preston
guilty on all counts.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. That court concluded
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defense
counsel’s proposal.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted both Preston’s and the State’s
petitions for writ of certiorari, which collectively presented five questions.
The court, however, answered only one: whether reasonable protective
housing is a “benefit” under MPJI-Cr 3:13.
The court of appeals purported to apply principles of statutory
interpretation to interpret the term “benefit” under MPJI-Cr 3:13. Preston,
444 Md. at 83-84, 118 A.3d at 912. The court also turned to case law from
Maryland and other jurisdictions for guidance. Id. at 85-103, 118 A.3d at 91324. Ultimately, though, the court decided Preston solely on its facts. Id. at 83
n.18, 104, 118 A.3d at 912 n.18, 924.
MPJI-Cr 3:13 has no formal or functional legislative history, because the
Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions are not statutory in nature. Preston, 444
Md. at 83 & n.19, 118 A.3d at 912 & n.19. Unsurprisingly, then, the court of
appeals could not interpret the term “benefit” from MPJI-Cr 3:13’s legislative
materials. Id. The court was similarly unable to glean an unambiguous
definition of “benefit” from that word’s plain meaning. Id. at 84, 118 A.3d at
912-13.
Maryland case law, moreover, proved equally unhelpful. Preston, 444 Md.
at 85-88, 118 A.3d at 913-15. The court of appeals examined five cases in
which the State induced a witness to testify. Id. (citing Harris v. State, 407
Md. 503, 966 A.2d 925 (2009); Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 946 A.2d 444
(2008); Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 702 A.2d 699 (1997); Riggins v. State, 152
Md. App. 181, 843 A.2d 115 (2004); Stouffer v. State, 118 Md. App. 590, 703
A.2d 861 (1997), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 352 Md. 97, 721 A.2d 207
(1998)). Those cases, however, carried little precedential value, because either
the particular inducement was not at issue, or the inducement was too
dissimilar to State-financed protective housing. Preston, 444 Md. at 85-88,
118 A.3d at 913-15 (citations omitted).
Additionally, the court of appeals examined a litany of out-of-state and
federal cases. Preston, 444 Md. at 90-103, 118 A.3d at 916-24 (citations
omitted). The court dismissed seven out-of-state cases as unpersuasive,
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because none involved relocation as the sole inducement provided to a witness.
Id. at 92-102, 118 A.3d at 917-23 (citations omitted).
Similarly, the court of appeals quickly dispensed with four federal cases in
which a State’s witness exchanged testimony for a package of inducements.
Preston, 444 Md. at 101-02, 118 A.3d at 923 (citations omitted). The court
deemed another eight federal cases “unpersuasive,” “unhelpful,” or irrelevant.
Id. at 90-91, 98-102, 118 A.3d at 916-17, 921-23 (citations omitted). As such,
the court necessarily decided Preston on its facts. Id. at 104, 118 A.3d at 924.
The court of appeals concluded that Payton’s eight-month stay in protective
housing, for which the State paid less than $14,000, was “not unreasonable”
in these circumstances. Preston, 444 Md. at 104, 118 A.3d at 924. Yet, the
court offered little support for its conclusion, other than to explain that, as
Moran put it, “It’s a lot for someone to move their life.” Id.
In Preston, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a “benefit,” under
Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:13, is something akin to a plea
agreement, prosecutorial immunity, a monetary reward, or another form of a
direct, quid pro quo exchange for a State’s witness’s testimony. 444 Md. at
85, 118 A.3d at 913 (emphasis added). The court of appeals, moreover, held
that reasonable protective housing is not a “benefit.” Id. at 85, 104, 118 A.3d
at 913, 924.
Read together, Preston implies that unreasonable protective housing is
“something akin to” a direct, quid pro quo exchange for a State’s witness’s
testimony, and therefore is a “benefit” under MPJI-Cr 3:13. Cf. Preston, 444
Md. at 85, 104, 118 A.3d at 913, 924. But the court of appeals explicitly
declined to define the scope of “reasonable protective housing.” Id. at 10304, 118 A.3d at 924. Instead, the court suggested that a State’s witness’s
protective housing arrangements require “some rough correlation” to her
ordinary living situation. Id. at 104, 118 A.3d at 924.
These holdings, and their resulting inferences, are too flimsy and too
ambiguous for Preston to carry any modicum of precedential or practical
value. First, Preston leaves open the possibility that protective housing, by
itself, would be unreasonable only if the State were to spend some amount of
money indefinitely greater than $14,000. Cf. Preston, 444 Md. at 104 & n.31,
118 A.3d at 924 & n.31.
Moreover, the court noticeably failed to apply its “rough correlation” test
to Payton’s home and her protective housing. Indeed, Preston conspicuously
lacks any quantitative or qualitative comparison between the two.
Consequently, the “rough correlation” test is nothing more than a blind,
aimless inquiry into the reasonableness of a State’s witness’s protective
housing.
Preston quietly suggests, therefore, that its holdings are limited to these
facts. To be sure, no case of precedential or practical value can turn on dubious
legal tests, like “something akin to” or “some rough correlation.”

